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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
more, it is a problem for which there is no easy solution. The drafting of
a detailed and rational set of Supreme Court Rules covering the entire
area of closing argument would be beneficial. Merely making rules,
however, does little good if defendants' rights are not enforced when
violated.49 Appellate courts, therefore, should take a more active posi-
tion in regulating the content of closing arguments. The reversal and
remand of a few cases would put heavy pressure on prosecutors to tone
down their language. However, because the appellate courts are not the
source of the problem, the real solution lies at the local level. Circuit
court judges should exercise their right to intervene when argument be-
comes prejudicial.50 Defense counsel should object when argument be-
comes improper. Most importantly, prosecutors should stay within the
proper limits of closing argument. The prosecuting attorney is a quasi-
judicial official whose primary duty according to the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility is "to seek justice, not merely to convict." 1 If a
prosecutor does not stay within the rules of his own volition, he should
be dealt with accordingly. Criminal defendants, even if guilty, should be
given a fair day in court.
CRAIG A. SMITH
GRAND JURY MAY NOT REPORT ON
MISCONDUCT OF PUBLIC OFFICIAL
WITHOUT INDICTMENT
In re Interim Report of the Grand Jury
Convened for the March Term of the
Seventh Judicial Circuit of Missouri 19761
A Clay County grand jury conducted an investigation of the official
conduct of Ed Stein, planning director of the Clay County Planning and
Zoning Commission. The grand jury filed an interim report with the
Circuit Court of Clay County and alleged that Mr. Stein had knowledge
of mishandling of official funds and had failed to take any corrective
49. State v. Jasper, 521 S.W.2d 182, 191 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975) (Dixon, J.
dissenting).
50. State v. Laster, 365 Mo. 1076, 1084, 293 S.W.2d 300, 305 (En Banc), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 936 (1956).
51. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC7-13; Mo. R. Civ. P.
4.05.
1. 553 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. En Banc 1977).
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RECENT CASES
action. However, no indictment was returned. Mr. Stein filed a motion
in the Circuit Court of Clay County to expunge the report from the
court's records. The motion was overruled, and a direct appeal was
heard by the Missouri Supreme Court 2 in exercise of its jurisdiction over
cases involving construction of the constitution. 3 The supreme court re-
viewed the applicable statutory and constitutional provisions and found
no authority to support the publication of a grand jury report on the
conduct of a public officer where an indictment was not returned. The
court thus ruled that Mr. Stein was entitled to expunction of the impro-
per report.
The decision was based on an examination of the common law his-
tory of the grand jury, applicable Missouri statutes, and the present Mis-
souri constitution. The authorities are divided on whether a grand jury
at common law had the power to file a report without indictment. 4 The
1875 constitution of Missouri expressly provided this power,5 and the
court avoided the necessity of adopting one of the two conflicting views
by assuming that the 1875 constitution was consistent with the common
law. 6
This section of the 1875 constitution was deleted, however, when
the 1945 (current) version of the constitution was debated and approved.
Although the legislative history seems to indicate that curbing of grand
jury reporting powers was not the purpose of the revision, 7 that indica-
tion is rebutted by a literal reading of the 1945 constitution in which the
authorizing provision is missing. The only section in the current con-
stitution relating to the powers of grand juries mentions the power to
investigate and indict for "all character and grades of crimes ....",,
2. An appeal could be taken at this point because the order overruling mov-
ant's motion was a final judgment for this purpose. State ex rel. Lashly v.
Wurdeman, 187 S.W. 257, 258 (Mo. En Banc 1916).
3. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 3.
4. 553 S.W.2d at 480, nn.8 & 9. See Oliver, Inquiry into the Powers of a Mis-
souri Grand Jury, 30 U.K.C.L. Rlv. 200 (1962); Weinstein & Shaw, Grand Jury
Reports-A Safeguard of Democracy, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 191. Many reports were
issued by grand juries at common law, but the mere existence of such reports
does not necessarily mean they were properly authorized. Research reveals that
many reports were filed pursuant to statute. It is the existence and propriety of
the nonstatutory reports that was at issue in In re Interim Report of the Grand Jury.
5. Mo. CONST. of 1875, art. XIV, § 11. "It shall be the duty of the grand jury
in each county, at least once a year, to investigate the official acts of all officers
having charge of public funds, and report the result of their investigations in
writing to the court." (emphasis added).
6. 553 S.W.2d at 481.
7. Weinstein & Shaw, supra note 4, at 200-01. The Journal of the 1943-44
Missouri Constitutional Convention indicates that the proponent of the amend-
ment to strike this section so moved to relieve poor counties in Missouri from the
constitutionally mandated annual expense of convening a grand jury, and be-
cause the section was legislative rather than constitutional.
8. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 16.
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The only express statutory power to report, other than by indictment,
empowers the grand jury to report on the condition of public buildings-'
In cases construing similar constitutional provisions, many courts
have concluded that the power to investigate implies the power to re-
port.10 The grand jury, as respondent in the principal case, also raised
this argument, but the court did not accept this reasoning. Instead it
apparently relied on the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius." In
other words because the power to report results of investigations of con-
ditions of public buildings is granted expressly, there is a meaningful
and "conspicuous absence" of provisions authorizing reports in other
areas. 12  The court reasoned that the legislature must have intended to
withhold such power for it would have been a simple matter to provide
expressly for reporting powers in other areas.
Only a handful of prior Missouri cases have made any reference to
grand jury reports. However, the current decision is in line with the
policy apparent in earlier cases.13 Although a grand jury is a nonadver-
sary proceeding, its functions are of a judicial nature.14 However, a libel
action has been permitted against grand jurors. 15 This indicates that a
report which exceeds statutory authority does not fall within the
privilege for judicial statements. In other words an unauthorized report
is beyond the judicial functions of the grand jury. The Missouri Su-
9. Section 540.020(2), RSMo (1969) provides: "A grand jury shall be con-
vened at the discretion of a judge of the court having the power to try and
determine felonies, to examine public buildings, and report on their condi-
tions .... "
10. See, e.g., Ex Parte Faulkner, 221 Ark. 37, 40, 251 S.W.2d 822, 823 (1952);
In re Report of Ormsby County Grand Jury, 74 Nev. 80, 85, 322 P.2d 1099,
1101-02 (1958); Jones v. People, 101 App. Div. 55, 57, 92 N.Y.S. 275, 276 ("Of-
ficial inquiry intends either official action or official report.") appeal dismissed sub
nom. In re Jones, 181 N.Y. 389, 74 N.E. 226 (1905), and cases cited therein.
11. "Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLAcK's LAW Dic-
TIONARY 692 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
12. 553 S.W.2d at 482. Accord, Hammond v. Brown, 323 F. Supp. 326, 344
(N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 450 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1971). "The expression of specific
power [by statute] to issue these particularized reports by clear implication of law
precludes a grand jury's lawful exercise of any unexpressed power to render
other types of written reports." (emphasis added).
13. In Conway v. Quinn, 168 S.W.2d 445 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942), a grandjury was in the midst of an investigation, so the court sought to protect the rights
and reputations of the persons being investigated by enforcing secrecy. It did not
require the stenographer to turn over a transcript of the proceedings to the
court unless that stenographer was required to testify concurrently before the
court. In dicta, however, the court indicated that it would make available the
grand jury's notes for certain purposes after indictment had been returned, im-
plicitly recognizing the importance of an opportunity to reply which is available
in the case of an indictment.
14. State ex rel. Hall v. Burney, 229 Mo. App. 759, 84 S.W.2d 659 (K. C. Ct.
App. 1935).
15. State ex rel. Clagett v. James, 327 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. En Banc 1959).
[Vol. 43
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preme Court has not previously ordered expunction of an unauthorized
grand jury report, although in an appropriate case, the court's hesitancy
was based on procedural technicalities.' 6
Cases from other jurisdictions on the subject of grand jury reports 17
may be divided roughly into two groups-those which broadly state that
the grand jury has authority to report because of common law prac-
tices,"' and those which declare that there is no reportorial power absent
explicit statutory or constitutional authority. 19 The latter concept is in-
herent in the principal decision and earlier case law in Missouri.
The majority view that grand jury reports should not condemn citi-
zens without indictment recently has gained a wider acceptance, 20 and
Missouri has joined the movement. California and Florida lead the
minority, but those states and New Jersey have moved closer to the
majority in recent decisions. 2' No cases have been found reversing this
trend.
Decisions from other jurisdictions may be divided further into grand
jury reports concerning public officials and those concerning private in-
dividuals. Most jurisdictions have allowed more liberal reporting on the
conduct of public officials than on the conduct of private citizens.22 A
16. State ex rel. Lashly v. Wurdeman, 187 S.W. 257 (Mo. En Banc 1916) (re-
fusal to grant a writ of mandamus compelling the circuit judge to strike the
report because all other modes of redress had not been exhausted).
17. Classifying the various jurisdictions is difficult because of diversity of
authorizing statutes and constitutional provisions which, although unacknowl-
edged by the courts, may affect the decisions in grand jury cases.
18. See cases cited in Weinstein & Shaw, supra note 4; In re Jessup, 50
Del. 530, 136 A.2d 207 (Super. Ct. 1957).
19. E.g., Ex parte Robinson, 231 Ala. 503, 165 So. 582 (1936); People v.
Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 430, 531 P.2d 761, 119 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1975); Kelley
v. Tanksley, 105 Ga. App. 65, 123 S.E.2d 462 (1961); Coons v. State, 191 Ind.
580, 134 N.E. 194 (1922); State ex rel. De Armas v. Platt, 193 La. 928, 192 So.
659 (1939).
20. See Comment, The Grand Jury: Its Present Day Function and Correlative
Powers, 29 FORDHAM L. Ruv. 152, 157 n.45 (1960); Hammond v. Brown, 323
F. Supp. 326 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 450 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1971); Kelley v.
Tanksley, 105 Ga. App. 65, 123 S.E.2d 462 (1961); In re Davis, 257 So. 2d 884
(Miss. 1972).
21. Compare Irwin v. Murphy, 126 Cal. App. 713, 19 P.2d 292 (1933) with
People v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 430, 531 P.2d 761, 119 Cal. Rptr. 193
(1975). Compare In re Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23) 89 A.2d 416
(1952) with In re Presentment by Camden County Grand Jury, 34 N.J. 378, 169
A.2d 465 (1961). Compare State ex rel. Brautigam v. Interim Report of the Grand
Jury, 93 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 1957) with In re Brevard County Grand Jury Interim
Report, 249 So. 2d 709 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
22. E.g., Ex parte Robinson, 321 Ala. 503, 165 So. 582 (1936) (city commis-
sioner); Ryon v. Shaw, 77 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1955).; Bennett v. Kalamazoo Circuit
Judge, 183 Mich. 200, 150 N.W. 141 (1914) (prosecuting attorney); State v.
Bramlett, 166 S.C. 323, 164 S.E. 873 (1932) (sheriff); In re Report of Grand
Jury, 123 Utah 458, 260 P.2d 521 (1953) (state welfare commissioner); In re
Grand Jury Report, 204 Wisc. 409, 235 N.W. 789 (1931) (city attorney).
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few courts have allowed condemnation of public officials or private indi-
viduals, except in extreme cases where the report was malicious or there
were indications that the evidence was insufficient or incompetent to
support conclusions of misconduct. 23 This line of cases has followed a
commonsense approach and shown little concern for authorizing statutes
or the common law.
Although there are no Missouri cases concerning a private indi-
vidual's censure by a grand jury, it would be a logical extension of In re
Interim Report of the Grand Jury to forbid the practice; the arguments
against the reporting of private citizens' conduct are even stronger than
the arguments against censure of public officials. It can be argued that
persons in official positions assume some risk of public censure (evident
in the limited privilege to defame public officials) 24 but also have a
greater opportunity to rebut damaging allegations 25 than do citizens not
holding public office. If expunction is granted to a public official, that
remedy surely would be available to a private citizen; 26 the converse,
however, may be less true. A motion for expunction might be denied in
both cases, however, if the movant himself called for the investigation.27
The power of the grand jury to report on general community con-
ditions, with or without authorizing statutes, also is uncertain. Courts
have stated that the benefit to the community of such reports outweighs
any danger to individual rights, especially since individuals seldom are
referred to directly.28 Some courts have upheld such reports on the
commonsense belief that the reports do little harm and may in fact be
helpful, without an analysis of the statutory or constitutional authority
for the reports. 29 Several jurisdictions have extended to the grand jury
the power to report on general conditions in the community even
though a public official's name may be incidentally referred to in a de-
leterious manner.30 Such decisions have refused expunction so long as
the grand jury was not found to be seeking an opportunity to impugn
23. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 430, 531 P.2d 761, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 193 (1975); In re Report of Grand Jury, 11 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1943); In re
Report of Grand Jury, 152 Md. 616, 137 A. 370 (1927) ("calculated to injure
reputation").
24. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
25. Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 HARV. L. R~v. 590, 595
(1961).
26. State ex rel. Strong v. District Court, 216 Minn. 345, 349, 12 N.W.2d 776,
778 (1944).
27. Hayslip v. State, 193 Tenn. 643, 249 S.W.2d 882 (1952).
28. E.g., Ex parte Faulkner, 221 Ark. 37, 251 S.W.2d 822 (1952); In re Bre-
vard County Grand Jury Interim Report, 249 So. 2d 709 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1971).
29. E.g., In re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Md. 616, 137 A. 370 (1927).
30. E.g., In re Brevard County Grand Jury, 249 So. 2d 709 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1971); Kelley v. Tanksley, 105 Ga. App. 65, 123 S.E.2d 462 (1961); In re
Grand Jury, 244 N.W.2d 253, 256 (Minn. 1976).
[Vol. 43
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the official's motives or character.3 1 Missouri presently appears to dis-
favor grand jury reports on general community conditions in light of the
court's requirement of a specific source of authority for such reporting
and the present lack thereof.
The Missouri Supreme Court's systematic attempt to trace a grand
jury report to a specific source of authority stands in sharp contrast to
cases in other jurisdictions based on similar facts. Many of these cases
were decided on the basis of public policy and past grand jury custom,3 2
rather than the presence of legal sources of grand jury powers. The
Missouri court only hinted at the many policy arguments which might
have been made. According to the court, the report should be expunged
"because it is a quasi-official accusation of misconduct which movant is
precluded from answering in an authoritative forum." 3  Not-
withstanding the court's slight mention of policy reasons, an examination
of the respective arguments leads to the conclusion that the court's deci-
sion was desirable. Recently commentators have scrutinized closely the
grand jury process and have questioned the reporting powers 34 and
even the existence of the grand jury in a modern legal system. 35 Be-
cause of the wide use of the grand jury in New York, that state has
handed down many decisions disputing the legality and utility of the
grand jury report.36 These opinions are replete with policy arguments
on both sides of the issue. Majority cases opposing the reporting powers
of the grand jury were preceded by the well-known dissent in In re
Jones 37 and then by the landmark reversal in Wood v. Hughes.38  These
authorities limited such reports primarily because they offended the
traditional rule of secrecy in grand jury investigations which was insti-
tuted to protect the reputations of those under investigation for which
insufficient evidence was adduced to return an indictment.3 9
31. E.g., In re Gulf County Grand Jury, 224 So. 2d 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969); State ex rel. Brautigam v. Interim Report of the Grand Jury, 93 So. 2d 99
(Fla. 1957); In re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Md. 616, 137 A. 370 (1927); In re
Report of Grand Jury, 123 Utah 458, 260 P.2d 521 (1953).
32. See, e.g., Ex parte Faulkner, 221 Ark. 37, 251 S.W.2d 822 (1952).
33. 553 S.W.2d at 482.
34. See, e.g., Edgar, The Propriety of the Grand Jury Report, 34 TEx. L. REv. 746
(1956); Younger, The Grand Jury Under Attack, 46 J. CluM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 26
(1955).
35. The grand jury system in England was abolished in 1933.
36. See Note, Grand Jury -Report Censuring Noncriminal Misconduct of Public
Official Unauthorized, 29 FOROHAM L.Rv. 592, 594 (1960).
37. 101 App. Div. 55, 92 N.Y.S. 275, appeal dismissed sub nom. In re Jones, 181
N.Y. 389, 74 N.E. 226 (1905) (Woodward, J., dissenting).
38. 9 N.Y.2d 144, 212 N.Y.S.2d 33, 173 N.E.2d 21 (1961)- The principal case
pointed out that the reason Wood v. Hughes is so important to the consideration
of the legal question in Missouri is that the statutes and constitution of New York
are almost identical to those of Missouri. 553 S.W.2d at 481.
39. See also Application of UEW, 111 F. Supp 858, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
1978] 355
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Another often repeated argument is that a grand jury report vio-
lates the concept of separation of powers.40  When the grand jury dic-
tates courses of conduct for the legislature to adopt or directs the dis-
missal of public officials, it usurps the power of the legislative and
executive branches. Furthermore, when a grand jury reports but fails to
indict, in effect it has failed to find enough evidence to meet the stan-
dard for criminality set by the legislature, 41 yet it has taken it upon itself
to condemn.
Other reasons given by courts for disallowing such reports have in-
volved lofty principles of due process 42 or general concepts of fair
play.4 3  The grand jury report has the often disastrous effect of con-
demning individuals through the judicial importance of a grand jury,
but denying a forum in which to respond.44 It often has been said that
a grand jury report is like a hit-and-run driver-it has the importance
of a judicial document, yet lacks the right to answer and appeal.45 Such
reports may be tantamount to indictment or conviction in the eyes of the
public, 46 for the distinction in the public eye between various judicial
proceedings and terminology is often elusive.47
The ex parte grand jury proceeding contrasts sharply to the adver-
sary trial which usually follows a grand jury indictment and which is
40. Id. The same reason was given in Hammond v. Brown, 323 F. Supp. 326
(N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 450 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1971).
41. In re Osborne, 68 Misc. 597, 604, 125 N.Y.S. 313, 318 (Sup. Ct. 1910):
"No matter how respectable or eminent citizens may be who comprise the grandjury, they are not above the law, and the people have not delegated to them
arbitrary or plenary powers to do that, under an ancient form, which they have
not a legal right to do."
42. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273-78, (1947); State ex rel. Brautigam
v. Interim Report of Grand Jury, 93 So. 2d 99, 102 (Fla. 1957).
43. See, e.g., Ex parte Burns, 261 Ala. 217, 221, 73 So. 2d 912, 915 (1954)
("To us it is not in accord with the American sense of fair play and justice in this
manner to deprive him of his good name and to put a stigma in this manner
upon his character."); In re Grand Jury, 244 N.W.2d 253, 255 (Minn. 1976); In
re Davis, 257 So. 2d 884, 888 (Miss. 1972); People v. McCable, 148 Misc. 330,
333, 266 N.Y.S. 363, 367 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
44. Meyer, Grand Jury Reports: An Examination of the Law in Texas and Other
Jurisdictions, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 374, 376 (1975).
45. People v. McCable, 148 Misc. 330, 333, 266 N.Y.S. 363, 367 (Sup. Ct.
1933).
46. Meyer, supra note 44, at 376 ("conviction by innuendo"). In In re Davis,
257 So. 2d 884, 888 (Miss. 1972) the court said:
The statement of a grand jury demands respect within a community
and its deliberations and conclusions are tantamount to fact in the eyes
of the populace. Our judicial system is couched in due process and
fairness. Conviction by innuendo resulting from an ex parte proceed-
ing is not compatible with, and is extremely offensive to these basic
principles of jurisprudence.
47. See Application of UEW, 111 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); In re Pre-
sentment by Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23, 89 A.2d 416 (1952).
[Vol. 43356
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replete with constitutional protections for the defendant. A grand jury
investigation is conducted by the prosecutor. Grand jurors may be
molded easily by the prosecuting attorney. This danger is not present in
an adversary proceeding where both sides of the controversy are pre-
sented and cross-examination is allowed. In the grand jury proceedings
the "accused" has no right to appear unless summoned, and if sum-
moned, no right to counsel within the courtroom. 48  A grand jury is
under the general authority of a court, but no judge is present to de-
termine questions of legality or sufficiency of evidence. The grand jury,
clothed with full subpoena power, functions virtually as an independent
investigatory body, yet it holds the awesome position of an arm of the
judiciary.
At common law the grand jury was considered the "conscience of
the community," 49 but one commentator pointed out that the decreas-
ingly representative character of today's grand juries means reports are
of less value to the public.5 0 Courts have pointed out the lack of objec-
tive standards to guide grand juries as a serious danger to personal
rights. A grand jury is selected, not elected, and consists of grand jurors
little skilled in proper techniques of investigation. 51 If reports are is-
sued without indictment, subjective personal standards 52 or even per-
sonal enmities may be substituted for the standards set down by the
legislature. 53 This practice of grand jury reporting has been accused of
being inconsistent with democratic ideals and the constitutional goal of a
"government of laws, not men." 54
The practical damage to a person who is named or inferentially re-
ferred to in a grand jury report is that if the circuit court accepts the
findings of the grand jury, those findings will be spread upon the public
record and commonly will reach the news media within hours.55 Be-
48. People v. Ianniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 235 N.E.2d 439, 288 N.Y.S.2d 462
(1968).
49. Weinstein & Shaw, supra note 4, at 202.
50. Dession & Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries, 41 YALE L.J.
687, 707 (1932). Perhaps the existence of a single state church (and therefore
arguably a more uniform public morality) and larger grand juries may have
made grand juries at common law more representative than the grand juries of
today which are smaller and derived from a more diversified society.
51. Hunt, Legality of the Grand Jury Report, 52 MIcH. L. Rlv. 711, 718 (1954).
52. Project, The Grand jury, 30 U.K.C.L. Rxv. 149, 197 (1962).
53. In re Report of Ormsby County Grand Jury, 74 Nev. 80, 85, 322 P.2d
1099, 1102 (1958). "The grand jury has no power, where the law is silent, to
declare certain acts to be public offenses through the fixing of standards in ac-
cord with its ethics or moral views."
54. Jones v. People, 101 App. Div. 55, 63, 92 N.Y.S. 275, 280, appeal dismissed
sub nor. In re Jones, 181 N.Y. 389, 74 N.E. 226 (1905) (Woodward, J., dissent-
ing).
55. Application of UEW, 11 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Bennett v.
Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, 183 Mich. 200, 50 N.W. 141 (1914).
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cause of grand jury secrecy, an individual often does not know of the
investigation until the findings are disseminated in this way. Con-
sequently, there is no opportunity to object until the damage has been
done. 6 Even if a report can be expunged from the record, it is doubt-
ful if the effects can be expunged easily from the minds of the public.
The "accused" may encounter difficulties in public dealings, business as-
sociations, and employment.
Proponents of the grand jury report argue primarily that if a grand
jury cannot investigate, there will be no one to act as the "watchdog" of
public officers and community affairs. If it is believed that grand jury
reports are needed or valuable in certain areas, procedures may be im-
plemented by legislatures to safeguard individual rights while allowing
reports to be filed. In New York, for example, a public official has an
opportunity to testify and twenty days to file an answer before the re-
port is made public.5 7  Congress has established similar safeguards for
the federal courts. An answer may be filed and witnesses may be called
so the grand jury process will conform more closely with due process
standards.5 8  Other solutions and safeguards may be developed by
legislatures in the future if reports are desired. It has been suggested 5
that the legislature and its committees afford the machinery for making
such reports after an investigation. The legislature, unlike the judicial
arm of government, carries with it the power to make changes to re-
spond to any problems discovered.
The decision in In re Interim Report of the Grand Jury does not impair
the grand jury's broad power of investigation into areas such as miscon-
duct of public officials, but it does limit the accompanying reporting
powers if conduct of a legislatively declared criminal nature is not found.
It is important not only because it clearly identifies expunction of the
report as the individual's remedy, but also because it declares that Mis-
souri grand juries do not have power to make such reports, nor courts
power to accept them. A democratic government, including its judicial
system, is formed primarily to protect the individual rights of citizens.
Individual rights should not be subordinated to public interest when the
scales have been found particularly uneven. In Missouri the need to
protect citizens' reputations has been adjudged to weigh heavier in the
balance.
RUTH A. SEARS
56. Meyer, supra note 44, at 377.
57. N.Y. CrM. PROC. LAW (McKinney) § 190.85.2(b), .3 (1971).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 3333 (1970).
59. Note, supra note 25, at 599.
[Vol. 43
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